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Anupam Chander

Corporate Law’s Distributive Design
Minorities, Shareholder and Otherwise1 makes two novel claims: that
corporate law places protection of minority shareholders at the heart of its
endeavor; and that this minority-mindfulness should have even greater
purchase in constitutional contexts. My retelling of the corporate law narrative
coupled with my extension of that story to the constitutional domain puts
pressure on scholars either to dispute my characterization of corporate law (or
for that matter, constitutional law) or to deny the relevance of that
characterization to the constitutional sphere. Alternatively and, I think, more
promisingly, it allows scholars to seek to understand or resolve law’s
inconsistent attitudes towards minorities in different domains.
I am glad to have the wisdom of Steven Bainbridge, Richard Delgado, and
Kevin Johnson in thinking through my boundary-transgressing endeavor.
Dean Johnson extends my thesis, arguing that immigrants, too, present the
kind of vulnerable minorities who might deserve legal solicitude, but observing
that the courts, through the plenary power doctrine, have disabled themselves
from providing such protection. Delgado meanwhile presses for an explanation
for the puzzle I identify: why does constitutional law neglect minorities while
corporate law embraces them? He locates the divide in majoritarian selfinterest.
Bainbridge, on the other hand, challenges my characterization of corporate
law as being minority focused. Because his paper, unlike the others, disagrees
with fundamental aspects of my argument, I will focus this reply to his claims,
reserving the others for consideration in future work. Part I rebuts Bainbridge’s
case analysis, demonstrating that the cases show clear judicial succor for
minority (by which I mean non-controlling) shareholders. Part II turns to
broader theoretical differences.
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cases
Bainbridge identifies cases that he believes show that corporate law
tolerates discrimination among shareholders (Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum
Co.,2 Moran v. Household Int’l., Inc.,3 and Zahn v. Transamerica Corp.4); allows
“selfish ownership” (Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc.5); has attenuated
concern for fairness in public corporations (Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien6); and
permits non-sharing of control premia (e.g., Treadway Companies, Inc. v. Care
Corp.7). In this part, I review these cases to show that they in fact support my
thesis.
Take Moran, in which the Delaware Supreme Court upheld a poison pill
against a minority shareholder attack. Bainbridge argues that the court’s rebuff
to Moran shows its willingness to tolerate discrimination against minority
shareholders. But Household’s board instituted the poison pill after it learned
that Moran, chairman of Household’s largest shareholder, had considered
leading a leveraged buy-out of Household. The court upheld the defensive
measure as a means to stave off “coercive two tier tender offers”8 that might
exploit the other shareholders.9
When Unocal instituted a defense that excluded hostile acquirer and
minority shareholder Mesa from a self-tender by Unocal, Mesa complained
that the board was discriminating amongst different classes of shareholders.
The court upheld the discrimination as a reasonable mechanism to prevent a
two tier tender offer, in which the second tier would consist in junk bonds,
“stamped[ing] shareholders into tendering at the first tier, even if the price is
inadequate.”10 Indeed, the court cited studies showing that shareholders often
benefited from the defeat of hostile takeovers.11
To the extent that Moran and Unocal demonstrate a court’s willing to
tolerate discrimination against a class of shareholders, it is simply a willingness
of the court to deal skeptically with potentially controlling shareholders whom
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493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947).
353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976).
280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971).
638 F.2d 357, 375 (2d Cir. 1980).
Moran v. Household Int’l., Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 1985).
Id.
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 956 (Del. 1985).
Id. at 956 n.11.
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the board, acting with independence and with due care, believes are hostile to
the interests of the firm’s other shareholders.
In Zahn, the court held that the corporation’s directors—“puppet[s]” to
Transamerica’s “puppeteer”12—had failed in their duty to “represent[] all the
stockholders.”13
Corporate law does not offer succor to every shareholder who owns less
than fifty percent of the corporation, especially when the minority shareholder
seeking the court’s protection intends to become the controlling shareholder
through a hostile takeover (or receive greenmail to stop trying). Courts
understand which shareholders truly need legal protection.14 Given rational
apathy, in a diffusely held corporation, a single large minority owner may
wield disproportionate influence in the company. Corporate law is not colorblind; relations of domination and subordination matter; the identity of the
parties is legally relevant.
Bainbridge argues that Wilkes affirms the possibility of “selfish ownership”
by majority shareholders. He makes two crucial omissions in this reference: (1)
the rest of the sentence; and (2) the rest of the decision. The court required
that any “selfish ownership” of majority shareholders must be “balanced
against their fiduciary obligation to the minority.”15 The court sided with
minority Wilkes, holding that the majority could have followed “an alternative
course of action less harmful to the minority’s interest.”16 Even though the
bylaws allowed the directors to set the salaries, the court held that Wilkes had
been unjustly removed from the payroll.
Bainbridge for his part says that I neglected to mention parts of the holding
in Sinclair Oil in which the court upholds the majority shareholder’s actions.
Indeed, Sinclair prevailed against the minority’s claim of excessive dividends
and missed business opportunities because the minority could not show any
harm to the company (and thus its minority shareholders) arising out of the
dividends or the firm’s expansion policy. In dismissing this part of the
minority’s claim, the court observed that the minority received its
“proportionate” share of the dividend.17 No harm, no foul. This victory for the
controlling shareholder does not undermine my argument. My claim is not
that the minority shareholder always wins, and on all counts. Being a minority
shareholder is not some sort of talisman that guarantees success at the bar.

12.
13.
14.
15.
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Bainbridge highlights the sale of control cases, which generally permit the
controlling shareholder to retain a premium upon the sale.18 While Berle and
others argued in favor of a sharing rule,19 the law generally permits “owners of
controlling blocs [to] sell at a substantial premium, without any obligation to
share the bounty with other shareholders.”20 But this does not disprove my
thesis. Corporate law permits controlling shareholders to earn premia because
such a position generally makes minority shareholders better off. An active
market for corporate control—fostered by control premia—is one of the
principal means of disciplining management. Bainbridge himself writes in his
impressive treatise that a “no sharing rule should facilitate replacement of
inefficient incumbents.”21 Some find “strong empirical support for the view
that the value of the noncontrolling shareholders’ shares increases following a
transfer of control.”22 If a sharing rule dampened the disciplinary force of the
market for corporate control, minority shareholders might be worse off in the
long run. Yet another feature of the case law protects minority shareholders
during changes of control: if a minority shareholder complains, judges
carefully scrutinize the transaction for evidence of looting or usurpation of
corporate opportunities.
theory
To locate occasional cases that fail to protect minority shareholders is not to
defeat my thesis. After all, no theory can satisfactorily explain all cases, and
there will be differing views as to whether a loss for minority shareholders in
one case may hold long-term benefit for minority shareholders overall. Judges
might also get a particular decision ‘wrong.’ My point is that the overarching
explanation for judicial action in corporate law matters can generally be found
in the simple goal of protecting minority shareholders. Corporate law is not
minority-status blind.
Consider the universe of persons who are the principal subjects of
corporate law: directors, officers, controlling shareholders, and minority

18.

19.
20.
21.
22.

One of Bainbridge’s citations for the general rule is inapposite: the sale of stock at issue in
Treadway “did not transfer control.” Treadway Companies, Inc. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357,
377 (2d Cir. 1980).
JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, COX & HAZEN ON CORPORATIONS § 12.01 n.2 (2d ed.
Supp. 2002) (collecting law review articles on the subject).
FRANK EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW
109 (1996).
STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 349 (2002).
COX & HAZEN, supra note 19, at § 12.01 .
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shareholders. Corporate law imposes fiduciary duties on all of these persons
with the exception of minority shareholders (unless they are also controlling
shareholders). Bainbridge’s colleagues have recently argued for the imposition
of fiduciary duties on activist, minority shareholders, highlighting this
lacuna.23 Minorities suggests that this lacuna is not accidental—but that the
duties themselves can be understood as flowing towards minority
shareholders.
Bainbridge denies the existence of “significant extra-contractual protections
for minorities.”24 But how then does Bainbridge explain fiduciary duties,
which, along with limited liability, form the core of corporate law? What are
these other than extra-contractual duties placed on directors, officers, and
controlling shareholders? There might be some out there who would eliminate
fiduciary duties entirely, collapsing corporate law into limited liability and,
maybe, securities regulation, but that is not our law today. To argue
alternatively that fiduciary duties represent merely the contract that one would
have found were it not for market failures and to conclude from this that
fiduciary duties are thus not “extra-contractual” is simply to rewrite the
meaning of “contract”—and seems especially hard to justify in the setting of
closed corporations with few principals.
Bainbridge also contests my analogy, saying that the constitutional domain
should properly be squared with the public corporation domain, not with the
law of closed corporations, thus declaring closed corporation cases to be
inapposite to my argument. He argues that closed corporations often involve
consensus-based decisionmaking, rather than the authority-based
decisionmaking prevalent in public corporations. But it is the lack of ready exit
that motivates the heightened fairness concerns and judicial policing in closed
corporation settings, not the supposed consensus-nature of the
decisionmaking. “No exit” is true of the constitutional domain as well, and
thus, I argue, should lead us to be similarly concerned with domination and
fairness in constitutional quarters.
Bainbridge’s critique leads me to revisit a carelessly worded footnote
defining affirmative action.25 I do not believe that corporate law seeks to
distribute disproportionately large gains to the minority; corporate law may
devote its own resources disproportionately towards minority protection, but it

23.
24.

25.
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certainly does not require that minorities get a disproportionate share of the
corporate spoils.
conclusion
My back and forth with Bainbridge suggests that there is room to wonder
what corporate law is all about. It is best not to adopt uncritically any given
orthodoxy, even when it is as appealing as the simple maximand of shareholder
wealth. My thesis in Minorities might go further—that shareholder wealth
maximization is wrong as a descriptive matter; the telos of corporate law is
shareholder wealth distribution. The business judgment rule immunizes so
much foolishness26 that it is hard to assert that courts play an active role in
promoting wealth maximization. Rather it might be more reasonable to assert
that judges simply police the distribution of the corporate gains (and make
sure that management is not grossly negligent).
Corporations have proven to be remarkably successful forms of enterprise
because of or despite a legal framework attentive to the most vulnerable among
those contributing capital. Ultimately, through Minorities, I hope to spur the
thought that human organizational forms stand to learn much from each other.
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